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THE AMBIVALENT EFFECT OF COMPLEXITY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE:  
A STUDY OF THE GLOBAL SERVICE PROVIDER INDUSTRY 
 
Abstract: Prior literature is ambivalent about whether organizational complexity has positive or 
negative effects on firm performance. Using rich data on global service providers, we explore 
this ambivalence by disentangling performance consequences of different types of organizational 
complexity. We show that complexity arising from the coordination of different services and 
operations negatively influences profit margins through increased coordination costs, whereas 
complexity coming from the sophistication of particular services may positively influence 
margins through informational advantages. We also investigate the moderating effects of process 
commoditization and client-specific investments. Our findings point to critical performance 
dilemmas facing global service providers in a highly competitive industry, and they help better 
differentiate performance effects of complexity at different organizational levels.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the performance implications of organizational complexity remains a key concern 
in management research. In response to increasingly multifaceted and dynamic global business 
contexts, firms often build up internal organizational complexity to better match environmental 
demands (Dougherty, 2004; Garud et al., 2011; Niosi, 2011). Yet, the implications of such 
actions remain ambivalent. On the one hand, complexity may jeopardize the organizational 
ability to process information (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), which 
in turn can increase the likelihood of decision errors and eventually lower firm performance 
(Levinthal, 1997). On the other hand, complexity may support capabilities that are difficult to 
monitor and imitate (Husted, 2007; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Rivkin, 2001), which in turn may 
promote rent appropriation and help firms develop a competitive advantage (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 1982; Powell et al., 2006).  
In this article, we explore the ambivalent performance consequences of organizational 
complexity. While existing research has produced important insights on how complexity may 
either deteriorate or enhance firm performance, less is known about when the opposing effects 
emerge. Hence, the aim of this article is to differentiate specific performance contingencies of 
organizational complexity. In doing so, we follow a long tradition in organizational theory in 
defining complexity as a property of a system characterized by a large number of interdependent 
organizational tasks and operations (Simon, 1962; Porter and Siggelkow, 2008; Zhou, 2013). 
Moreover, rather than treating complexity as a single organizational construct, we emphasize that 
different types of organizational complexity may yield different performance effects. Following 
existing research (e.g., Larsen et al., 2013; Løwendahl and Revang, 1998; Siggelkow, 2001), we 
explore the different performance effects of configuration complexity, i.e., complexity arising 
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from coordinating various organizational tasks and operations, and task complexity, i.e., 
complexity arising from coordinating needs within particular tasks. 
Our empirical context are global service providers who provide a range from simple to 
sophisticated services from a number of locations to satisfy client demand (Manning et al., 
2015), which makes this industry particularly suitable for our purpose. We argue that while both 
configuration and task complexity imply coordination costs, their performance implications are 
different. As for configuration complexity, coordination costs increase as providers coordinate a 
larger number of interdependent operations and locations (Rawley, 2010; Zhou, 2011). As such, 
this type of complexity has negative effects on firm performance. Task complexity, which is 
more specific to particular client services, also generates coordination costs. Yet, we argue that 
this type of complexity may positively influence profit margins. Specifically, we suggest that the 
coordinative specialization associated with task complexity promotes information asymmetry 
between providers and clients (Nayyar, 1993). Providers with informational advantages are thus 
better able to shift or delegate a larger portion of coordination costs to the client. Thereby, 
suppliers are able to offset the coordination costs involved in performing particular tasks and 
appropriate higher economic rents. Finally, we also argue and show empirically that the 
magnitude of performance effects of complexity depend on the moderating effects of process 
commoditization and client-specific investment.  
With this research, we make several important contributions. As firms increase scale and 
scope in response to changing environments and client needs, our results point to important 
performance trade-offs between managing coordination costs and meeting client expectations. In 
more general, our study reveals why treating organizational complexity as an aggregate construct 
(cf., Houchin and MacLean, 2005) is insufficient and why instead a more fine-grained 
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understanding of complexity and its effects is needed. Thus, our findings not only help better 
understand performance conditions in the increasingly important service provider industry, but 
also have important strategic implications for any firm confronted with managing complex 
operations.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Disentangling organizational complexity 
Much work has been devoted to investigating the consequences of organizational complexity. 
Beginning in the 1960s with the open-systems view of organizations, complexity has been a 
central construct in explaining the internal and external interconnectedness of organizations (cf., 
Anderson, 1999; Houchin and MacLean, 2005; Moldoveanu and Bauer, 2004). For example, in 
his seminal article on the architecture of complexity, Simon (1962: 468) describes a complex 
system as “one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way”. In a 
similar manner, Thompson (1967) portrays a complex organization as a set of many 
interdependent tasks and argues that a central managerial challenge is to cope with its 
consequences. This view suggests that systems are complex when the different organizational 
components are growingly interdependent (e.g., Albert et al., 2015; Porter and Siggelkow, 2008; 
Simon, 1962). For example, an organization managing a number of different activities in a wide 
spread of countries can be regarded as more complex than a solely domestic organization dealing 
with only few activities.  
Based on this view of complexity, a main consequence of complexity is its associated 
coordination costs (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson, 1967; Zhou, 2011). Coordination costs can be 
understood as the costs involved in establishing effective communication and decision-making 
among organizational members to complete work jointly, and to orchestrate operations across or 
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within organizational boundaries (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Accordingly, an increasingly 
interdependent organization requires costly investments into appropriate mechanisms of 
communication to ensure efficient coordination. For example, in the late 2000s Cisco Systems 
invested heavily in sophisticated virtual conferencing and other communication technology to 
more effectively coordinate its globally distributed operational structure, including two 
headquarters in San Jose and Bangalore, and to facilitate decision-making across locations. 
Similarly, Manning et al. (2013) describe in their study of a German automotive supplier how the 
costly investment of a dozen engineering support centers around the world created the demand 
for new ‘interface management’ roles and staff positions to ensure quality control. Both 
examples stress how organizational complexity increases coordination costs, which, in turn, puts 
pressure on the financial performance of organizations. In addition, the information processing 
demand caused by complex systems may spur organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), and undermine precision in decision-making, thus further 
challenging firm performance (Larsen et al., 2013; Levinthal, 1997).  
However, instead of seeing complexity as a comprehensive, unanimous source of 
coordination costs, we emphasize that different types of complexity exist within organizational 
systems simultaneously and that different types may generate different performance effects (e.g., 
complexity in organizations, tasks, projects, etc.). For example, Siggelkow (2001) points out in 
his study of the fashion company Liz Claiborne that organizational complexity arises from 
interdependencies both within and between major internal value chain activities (e.g., the product 
portfolio, marketing, production, etc.). Studying hidden costs in offshoring, Larsen et al. (2013) 
similarly distinguish between complexity within tasks (task complexity) and between tasks and 
operations (configuration complexity). Whereas the former drives cost underestimation 
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especially when tasks are outsourced, the latter increases hidden costs particularly when 
operations are coordinated internally. In addition, prior studies suggest that coordination 
challenges of configuration and task complexity may differ. For example, Manning et al. (2013) 
emphasize in their study that the effective conduct of specific engineering tests (task complexity) 
may require interface management, but that securing quality control across test centers 
(configuration complexity) requires continuous learning and exchange of good practice among 
interface managers. These studies therefore suggest that a distinction between configuration and 
task complexity may be useful to disentangle performance effects and contingencies of 
organizational complexity. 
Along these lines, we define configuration complexity as a property of interdependencies 
connecting the operations of an organization (Blau and McKinley, 1979; Damanpour, 1996). 
More specifically, configuration complexity is related to the multiplicity of and linkages between 
locations and operations within an organization. It arises from various coordination needs, 
including strategic alignment and resource allocation, across often concurrent operations. As 
such, a firm operating a number of manufacturing plants across locations can be characterized as 
more complex than a firm operating a single facility at a single location.  
Task complexity concerns the complexity inherent in individual organizational tasks (e.g., 
Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986; Hærem et al., 2015) and relates to the “a priori determinability of, 
or uncertainty about, task outcomes, process, and information requirements” (Byström and 
Järvelin, 1995: 194). As recently emphasized by Weigelt and Miller (2013: 1413), task 
complexity is reflected by the number and interdependencies of specialized knowledge 
exchanges between actors required for successful task implementation. Accordingly, task 
complexity typically arises from the need to coordinate task completion with the expectations of 
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those ‘requesting’ a task. In this study, we thus focus specifically on tasks requested from other 
internal or external clients of the organization. 
The performance effects of configuration and task complexity 
In the following, we develop hypotheses on the performance effects of the two types of 
complexity. As firm performance is inherently multifaceted and thus difficult to conceptualize 
and interpret (Miller et al., 2013), we focus explicitly on the profit margins that suppliers can 
obtain from their operations vis-à-vis their clients. Profit margins have become a key concern for 
suppliers as products and services have become more commoditized and competition for client 
projects has increased (Davenport, 2005). Specifically, we argue that coordination costs arise 
from both types of complexities, but that their impacts on performance may differ. Task 
complexity in particular may induce information asymmetries vis-à-vis clients and thus create 
opportunities for shifting or delegating coordination costs and thus appropriating economic rents. 
We thus expect opposing effects on the profit margin of a firm’s operations. 
First, when firms take configurational actions such as diversifying their operations across 
functions and geographies, they must engage in the costly act of coordinating interdependencies 
connecting these different operations. This effect has been well documented in prior studies. For 
example, Zhou (2011) argues that the potential synergistic benefits of related diversification 
among U.S. equipment manufacturers may be offset by the added complexity and costs of 
managing interdependencies between different business lines. Rawley (2010) argues that 
diversifying from taxicab to limousine services creates complexities and coordination costs that 
offset economies of scope and increase organizational rigidity. In other words, as firms increase 
configuration complexity, they need to invest resources in mechanisms to accommodate for new 
coordination requirements (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). Thus, while strategies like 
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diversification can create long-term benefits such as synergies and new market opportunities, 
firms need to invest in additional coordination efforts. Therefore, higher configuration 
complexity should in the intermediate term lead to increased coordination costs, which, ceteris 
paribus, negatively influences the margins that firms can appropriate from their operations 
(Larsen et al., 2013; Rawley, 2010; Zhou, 2011).  
 As for task complexity, we emphasize that the often vague and ambiguous requirements 
associated with the completion of complex tasks (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986) allow task 
providers to delegate part of the coordination costs to clients. Complex tasks typically require 
specialized, and often intangible, knowledge, skill sets and the use of advanced technologies. A 
consequence of this, however, is the generation of ‘zones of uncertainty’ (Crozier and Friedberg, 
1980) and information asymmetries that task providers can exploit vis-à-vis their clients 
(Nayyar, 1993). For example, in order to perform a complex task to client satisfaction, providers 
may ask clients to invest additional time and resources in specifying the deliverable and/or in 
adding their own personnel to service delivery teams, which generates extra costs on the client 
side. The more complex the task the less able the client will be to monitor what resources the 
service provider utilizes (vs. the client) in provision of the task, and the client is consequently 
restrained from controlling strategizing behavior of the provider.  
 Providers may thus exploit their specialized knowledge involved in the performance of 
tasks and related sub-tasks towards clients who often lack insight into internal task operations. 
Also, as task complexity often encompasses multiple actors (Hærem et al., 2015) and unfolds 
through processes and activities with the involvement of partners, the costs of coordinating 
within-task interdependencies are typically distributed heterogeneously across various actors. 
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Accordingly, we expect that those actors controlling critical information are in a better position 
to delegate coordination costs to those suffering from information asymmetry. 
 Complex consulting projects whose value creation is typically not transparent to clients 
provide a good example of this mechanism (Sturdy, 1997). Consulting firms often co-determine 
the composition of project teams with clients and specify what information and services clients 
need to provide in order for projects to succeed. In particular, complex projects give consulting 
firms the opportunity to delegate parts of the costs of coordination to clients. As such, the 
providers with superior knowledge on task-related processes are in a better position to delegate 
the coordination costs stemming from projects to the clients, and to hence appropriate economic 
rents from information asymmetries (e.g., Nayyar, 1993). 
Taken together, we hypothesize that configuration and task complexity differ in their 
performance effects, mainly due to differences in the ability of firms to ‘distribute’ coordination 
costs. Whereas firms largely bear the coordination costs from configuration complexity, they can 
partially delegate coordination costs at the task level. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: Configuration complexity is negatively related to the profit margins of a 
firm’s operations. 
Hypothesis 1b: Task complexity is positively related to profit margins of a firm’s 
operations. 
The moderating effects of commoditization and client-specific investments 
While performance effects of organizational complexity are ambivalent, they are also contingent 
upon key moderating mechanisms. Following the logic extrapolated above, measures that reduce 
coordination costs should positively influence the performance effects of configuration 
complexity, while measures that reduce information asymmetry should negatively influence the 
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performance effects of task complexity. To explore this, we focus on the moderating effects of 
process commoditization and client-specific investments.  
First, we argue that process commoditization affects the performance effects of 
configurational complexity. Specifically, the degree to which tasks and processes are 
standardized and modularized has important implications for keeping the coordination costs 
derived from configuration complexity at bay (Davenport, 2005; Sako, 2006; Tanriverdi et al., 
2007). Standardization may ease comparative measures of performance and make information 
less ‘sticky’ (von Hippel, 1994; Kumar et al., 2009). Standardization also facilitates personnel 
exchanges, staff hiring and training, and supports the overall operational flexibility across a 
growing number of locations and service operation (Manning et al., 2015).  
Moreover, commoditization is based on the principle of process modularity which 
describes the degree to which processes can be broken up into modular, semi-independent sub-
processes, and which complements potential coordination needs arising from increasing diversity 
of operations and distribution of locations (Davenport, 2005; Simon, 2002). In a highly dispersed 
system, being able to perform sub-processes semi-independently in different locations not only 
generates specialization and efficiency advantages, but also lessens the need for costly 
coordination.  For example, Manning et al. (2015) show how global service providers choose to 
set up networks of service delivery hubs across the world particularly for highly commoditized 
services, such as IT and tech support, facilitated by the reduced need for communication between 
locations. By keeping coordination costs low, providers can re-direct resources to various 
sources of revenue generation, such as client acquisition. In other words, while setting up global 
networks of service operations does increase configurational complexity for providers, process 
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commoditization reduces the need for communication and coordination, and mitigates negative 
effects complexity might otherwise have on performance.  
Therefore, a high degree of process commoditization offers a mechanism to reduce 
coordination costs, and should accordingly reduce the negative consequences of configuration 
complexity on profit margins (as hypothesized in H1a): 
Hypothesis 2a: The negative association between configuration complexity and profit 
margins is positively moderated by the degree of process commoditization. 
As for task complexity, we argue that client-specific investments have a particularly 
strong moderating effect. Above we argued that information asymmetry allows firms to 
appropriate higher economic rents from performing complex tasks through the delegation of 
coordination costs. However, information asymmetries may be reduced through client-specific 
investments—investments into tasks, processes and technologies supporting operations that 
make these more specific to client operations and requirements (e.g., Williamson, 1975). We 
argue that such investments lower the positive performance effects of task complexity. As firms 
align their processes and technologies with their clients—for example, by using the same process 
specifications, by training staff according to client-specific requirements, or by applying the 
same performance evaluation criteria— information asymmetry goes down as it becomes easier 
for clients to monitor and evaluate processes and performance. Even if clients are unfamiliar 
with sub-processes involved in performing particular tasks, a high level of process and client 
integration thanks to client-specific investments generates more frequent and immediate 
feedback (Luo et al., 2013), thus lowering the ability of providers to generate margins. 
 However, client-specific investments also have a more direct effect on the way in which 
coordination costs are distributed. A large part of the coordination costs arising from task 
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complexity occur in form of task-specific investments. The more providers are able to make 
clients invest into the successful completion of tasks, the more are they able to delegate costs of 
coordination. Likewise, the more clients are able to make providers invest, i.e. make client-
specific investments, the more do providers need to bear coordination costs. To what extent each 
party needs to make specific investments may be a result of each party’s bargaining power and 
other factors. For example, leading original equipment manufacturers in the automotive sector 
typically have the power to make their suppliers invest into particular client-specific systems and 
standards to facilitate task delivery. This will increase coordination costs for suppliers, while at 
the same time reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis clients, which, in combination, has a 
negative impact on suppliers’ margins. We thus hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive association between task complexity and profit margins is 
negatively moderated by the degree of client-specific investments. 
METHODS 
Research context: The global service provider industry  
We investigate how configuration and task complexity affect performance in a relatively new, 
yet fast growing and increasingly important industry: the global service provider industry. 
Facilitated by increasing digitization and commoditization of business processes, client firms 
across industries, from the U.S. and Western Europe in particular, increasingly outsource 
business process tasks (such as IT infrastructure, payroll, tech support, inbound and outbound 
calls, but also software development and testing, engineering support and product design) to 
specialized service providers operating across the world.  
We find this context particularly apt for our research purpose. Increasing client demand 
for outsourcing services has been paralleled by a sophistication of the supply of various service 
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tasks and the development of client-serving capabilities (Athreye, 2005; Ethiraj et al., 2005). For 
example, several large providers headquartered in India have developed so-called global delivery 
models involving distributed teams at both onshore (client-side) and offshore facilities, which 
collaborate across time zones (Manning et al., 2015). Yet, this increasing ability to provide 
numerous services globally through distributed delivery structures entails interdependencies 
across locations and as such increases the configuration complexity of service operations. 
Similar to client firms with large-scale internal offshore operations, full-service providers are 
challenged by increasing coordination and overhead costs affecting not only cost savings for 
clients but their own margins as well.  
Moreover, the range of tasks—from routine and standardized, to complex and knowledge 
intensive—has also increased. Whereas prior to 2000, most service providers focused on 
commoditized IT and software tasks (e.g., Dossani and Kenney, 2007; Ethiraj et al., 2005), over 
time providers have not only increased the spectrum of more standardized service offerings (e.g., 
Jones 2000; Sako, 2006), but also added more complex, often knowledge-intensive services, 
such as engineering, design, and analytical services (Lewin et al., 2009).  
Data collection 
We test our hypotheses based on service provider survey data collected by the international 
Offshoring Research Network (ORN) between 2007 and 2012. The ORN was an international 
research initiative launched in 2004 at Duke University, which involved partner universities in 
Europe and Asia. A number of papers have been published based on ORN data (e.g., Elia et al., 
2014; Larsen et al., 2013; Lewin et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2008). The majority of these papers 
have applied ORN client data. By contrast, we draw primarily on ORN service provider data 
which was collected both on the firm level and the service level. Survey items and results of 
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initial survey rounds were regularly presented at workshops and webinars to consultants, 
industry experts and practitioners, and feedback from these interactions was integrated into the 
survey design. The survey was taken online where respondents reached the survey website 
through external links or email invitations. Once registered and approved by the ORN survey 
team, respondents were added to the database. In some cases, in particular large firm respondents 
would submit the survey only partially completed, resulting in a number of missing variables. 
We address the related risk of nonresponse bias below.  
Sample 
Our database contains data from 755 providers based in different countries and regions. While 
most providers in the sample are major players, such as Accenture, Infosys, TCS, IBM Global 
Services, Genpact, Tata Consulting, our sample also includes small and midsized firms. It should 
be noted, however, that only 191 providers provided sufficiently detailed information resulting in 
a usable sample of 432 data points (as each provider on average has responded for 2.3 classes of 
service). Our sample includes providers headquartered all over the world offering different 
classes of services to global clients. The three most important provider headquarter locations are: 
USA (33.9%), India (12.7%), and China (11.5%). The three most important classes of services 
are: IT (20.6%), Software (17.7%), and Call Centers (9.2%).  
 We examined the risk of nonresponse bias by comparing selective sample distributions of 
the completed responses sample with the missing responses sample in terms of firm size, 
headquarter location, and distribution of tasks specified. As for headquarter and service 
distribution, differences between subsamples are insignificant. This is not the case for size, 
however. The completed responses sample is significantly biased towards small firms with less 
than 500 employees (60%) and midsize firms with more than 500 but less than 10,000 employees 
16 
 
(32%) versus large firms with more than 10,000 employees (8%). By comparison, the missing 
responses sample has a distribution of 25% large, 40% midsize and 35% small firms. The main 
reason for this difference is the difficulties many large firm respondents encounter when taking 
the detailed multi-level questionnaire with arrays of questions for each type of service. Although 
various methods exist to replace missing values, we decided to only use actual responses. We 
followed the rationale that respondents giving information on all items are likely to be more 
accurate with any particular data item than respondents giving only partial information. While 
the resulting exclusion of a number of larger firms might be a limitation, one positive side effect 
of the resulting bias towards smaller firms is that the initial overrepresentation of large firms in 
the total sample is corrected. This overrepresentation was initially due to the strategy of 
including most major service providers. In practice, however, midsize and smaller firms are the 
vast majority of providers which is reflected in the completed responses sample. 
Moreover, common method bias is an obvious limitation of survey based measures. To 
address this issue, we performed a number of statistical analyses to assess the severity of this 
bias. The Harman’s one-factor test on the variables indicated that common methods bias was not 
an issue as multiple factors were detected and the variance did not merely stem from the first 
factors (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In fact, the 29 variables included in the model (all listed in 
Table 1) form several factors with an eigenvalue > 1 and with the two major factors only 
explaining 9% and 8%, respectively. In addition, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis where all 
items loaded on the same factor (a Single Factor Model). The assumption is that the existence of 
a single factor that is the common denominator across all items reflects the presence of a 
common method bias (Podsakoff et. al, 2003). However, in our case the goodness-of-fit statistics 
is highly unsatisfactory for the Single Factor Model capturing the common method bias, which 
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indicates that we do not have a major problem of common method bias in the data. Furthermore, 
we conducted an analysis involving marker variables (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). Although 
these marker variables in some cases have separate explanatory power, they do not remove the 
significance of our key variables. Finally, the questionnaire of the service provider survey 
consisted of different scales (some of which were reversed). This, in combination with the fact 
that our results are based on complex estimations that involve multiple independent variables and 
interaction terms, makes it highly unlikely that the results of such models emerge solely as a 
result of common method bias (Siemsen et al., 2010).  
Measures  
The basic unit of analysis is the class of service (e.g., “Call center” or “Legal services”) offered 
by the service provider. A complete list of all the 12 classes of service included in this study is 
provided in the correlation matrix – Table 1 – as variables 14-25). Within each class of service, 
providers typically perform multiple tasks. For example, as part of ‘finance and accounting 
services’, providers may perform accounts payable and receivable, cash management, credit card 
operations, fixed asset accounting, etc. Configuration complexity thus relates to the complexity 
of operations and locations supporting a service class, whereas task complexity concerns the 
average complexity of the actual tasks provided within a service class. All variables are 
measured at the level of the class of service.  
Dependent variable 
Profit margins is a measure of the average return for offering services within each class of 
service that a service provider offers. This implies that profit margins are measured at the level 
of each class of service rather than across services. Interestingly, many prior studies on global 
services outsourcing have focused on client performance, in terms of cost savings, service 
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quality, data security and reliability (e.g., Ellram et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2013), whereas provider 
performance has been somewhat neglected (but see e.g., Lahiri and Kedia, 2009; Lahiri et al., 
2012). From a provider’s perspective, in particular profit margins have become a key concern, as 
services have become more commoditized and competition for client projects has increased. 
Thus, we focus explicitly on provider’s margins as a primary performance indicator. Since no 
objective measure is available in our data for profit margins at the service level, the information 
for this variable was acquired as a self-reported measure. More specifically, respondents were 
asked to indicate “for each class of services that your company provides, what is the average 
achieved margin (in %) on deals (once deals have been implemented)?” Respondents were asked 
to indicate the average margin in percentage (i.e., revenue – costs / revenue * 100%) over deals 
in the same class in order to even out fluctuations on individual deals. The margin can vary from 
a negative value if costs exceed revenue to almost 100% if costs are negligible compared to 
revenue. The average profit margin across the 446 observations is 26% with significant variation 
as the standard deviation is 18.6% (see Table 1).  
Independent variables   
Configuration complexity is a constructed measure that seeks to capture the complexity deriving 
from maintaining often multiple, distributed operations and related interdependencies within a 
particular service class. Following Larsen et al. (2013), we measure configuration complexity 
through three distinct items: the number of tasks performed within a particular service class, the 
dispersion of service delivery locations, and the number of employees in the given service class 
(see also Blau and McKinley, 1979; Damanpour, 1996). Thus, we created a variable that allows 
us to proxy the complexity of the entire organizational set-up around the provision of particular 
types of services, rather than the complexity residing within the completion of particular tasks. 
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We assume that a service provider conducting a multiple tasks within a particular class of service 
from multiple locations with several employees is more likely to engage in costly coordination 
than a service provider performing only one or two services within the same class from a few 
locations with few employees. Operationally, our variable is measured as the product of number 
of tasks a firm performs within a service class; the number of locations a firm conducts services 
from; and the logarithm of the number of staff employed (in thousands) in the service class. All 
three items were standardized before multiplying them in order to give them equal weight in the 
composite measure. The mean of this variable is 0.1 (see Table 1), but with a substantial 
variation given the standard deviation of 0.36. 
Task complexity is a single-item measure capturing the complexity of performing tasks 
within a particular class of service. The respondents were asked about the characteristics of tasks 
within each class of service provided by the company. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very 
low”, 3 is “average” and 5 is “very high” respondents were asked the following exact question: 
“For each class of services that your company provides, please indicate the degree to which the 
tasks involved have the following characteristics: highly complex.” The purpose of including this 
measure is to capture the complexity inherent in performing individual tasks for particular 
clients, rather than the complexity of coordinating the entire set-up of globally dispersed 
operations and teams within a service class (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Larsen et al, 2013). We draw 
on previous research in assuming that a high degree of task complexity equals tasks with more 
internal interdependencies (Murmann, 1994; Weigelt and Miller, 2013). For example, Weigelt 
and Miller (2013: 1413) emphasize that “Complex tasks build on a greater number of specialized 
knowledge sets and require more interdependency and knowledge exchange between actors for 
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their execution than do simpler tasks.” Descriptive statistics on this variable (Table 1) show that 
the mean is 3.6 which is well above the median (of 3) on the 5-point scale. 
Moderating variables 
Process commoditization is a single-item reflective measure capturing the degree to which the 
operation of a particular class of service has become highly commoditized, in terms of the 
standardization and modularity of tasks and processes within that service class. For example, 
highly commoditized types of services are based on process standards that are widely shared in 
the industry. Respondents were asked “for each class of services that your company provides, 
how commoditized has this service become?” and they indicated this on a 5-point scale (1=very 
low and 5=very high). The mean of the variable is 3.1 (Table 1), but with some variation given 
the standard deviation of 1.04.  
Client-specific investment is a measure of the extent to which the provider has to make 
investments before providing services that are specific to a particular client (and of less value for 
other clients). Respondents were asked “for each class of services that your company provides, 
to what extent does your company have to make client-specific investments?” Specifically, we 
focus on an item which asked respondents to indicate on a 5-point scale (1=not at all and 5=to a 
great extent) to what extent a class of service requires “client-specific investments in training”. 
The mean of the variable is 3.3 (Table 1), which is above the median of the 5-point scale. 
Notably, the survey also asks for client-specific investments in software and infrastructure. 
However, we focus here on training since our main interest is in capturing how clients counter-
balance potential information asymmetries. As clients participate in providing task-specific 
knowledge to provider staff through training, the information asymmetries evaporate. For 
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robustness checks, however, we also used combined measures for client-specific investments 
leading to qualitatively similar results. 
Control variables 
To further capture variance related to main variables of interest, we include a number of control 
variables. First, the years of provider experience with a particular service class and the total 
number of classes of services offered by the service provider are taken as proxies for the 
competencies and resources that the provider has accumulated over the years which is expected 
to have a positive effect on profit margins. Specifically, we assume in line with previous studies 
that global sourcing experience allows both clients and providers to develop the capacity to 
better manage and drive down the costs of a complex, globally dispersed set-up of operations 
(e.g., Massini et al., 2010). Thus, experienced service providers can be expected to generate 
higher margins than inexperienced providers. The average number of years of experience is 9.17 
years, but with a span from 0 years to 85 years of experience, while the number of different 
classes of services offered varies from 1 to 10 with an average of 3.75. 
Second, we control for different aspects of the client relationship. Duration of deals (the 
average number of months that deals last for a given class of service) is controlled for as profit 
margins might decrease as clients learn to better anticipate costs but also capitalize on the 
willingness of providers to negotiate longer deals for discount rates. As shown in Table 1, the 
average is 2.26 while the span is from 0 to 37 months. Similarly, it is expected that the scope for 
information asymmetry diminishes in long-lasting relationships as clients acquire more 
knowledge on the involved tasks and their costs. Respondents were asked to provide the 
percentage of relationships that lasted <1 year, 1-2 years, 2-4 years, 5-6 years, 7-9 years and >= 
10 years, respectively. We have collapsed this information into the share of relationships lasting 
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5 years or more (on average, this is the case for 35% of relationships; standard deviation 32.5% – 
we controlled for other cut-off points and found similar results). Specification of contracts is also 
controlled for as rent appropriation by the provider might be explained by loose and ill-specified 
contracts that similarly provide scope for strategizing behavior by the provider. Therefore, we 
expect profit margins to be negatively related to the level of contract specification. Respondents 
were asked for each class of service to indicate on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree and 
5=strongly agree) whether deals are characterized by “highly specified contracts”. The average 
value obtained is 3.3 with a standard deviation of 1.03. Finally, we included a dummy variable 
on whether providers use subcontractors (1 – uses subcontractors; 0 – no subcontractors) for a 
particular service class as this might further increase coordination costs but also increase 
information asymmetry (the mean value is 0.25 with a standard deviation of 0.43). 
Third, we included two variables on the external environment that may also affect the 
profit opportunities in the particular service area: competition and innovation. We control for the 
level of competition for client deals in the specific service area since profit margins might be a 
reflection of the lack of competition. Competition is calculated as the ratio of demand over 
supply in the specific service area; i.e., the number of outsourcing projects in a specific service 
area across the client population is divided by the number of providers offering this type of 
service. The number of outsourcing projects across the client population is collected from ORN-
client data, while the number of providers offering respective services is gathered in ORN-
provider data. Importantly, the ORN client survey captures, for each client firm, the total number 
of outsourcing projects in each category, rather than just whether or not a particular client has 
outsourced a particular task. This allows for a more nuanced demand measure. Compatibility 
between these two data sets is ensured by the same codification of classes of services. The 
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average is 56.3 with a standard deviation of 27.7. Also the level of needed innovation in the 
service area might affect profit opportunities as more innovation on the provider side will foster 
information asymmetry and weaken the position of the client in relation to the provider 
(Dougherty, 2004). The innovation needed is captured by asking respondents to rate the 
following driver for clients to engage in the relationship on a scale from 1 to 5: “Enhance 
capacity for innovation” (the average is 3.2 and the standard deviation is 1.1).  
Finally, to capture variation of profit margins coming from specific properties of each 
class of service, we controlled for the type of services by using “other services” as a baseline and 
by including 12 dummy variables (one for each of the remaining classes of service), since the 
level of profit margins might also vary with the class of service. Similarly, we controlled for the 
location of the headquarters of the service providers by including 4 dummies (Asia, Europe, 
Latin America and North America) and using the rest of the world as the baseline. Here, the 
assumption is that being headquartered closer to major clients, e.g., in Europe or North America, 
may positively affect profit margins.  
RESULTS 
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 1. None of the independent variables have correlations 
that indicate problems of multi-collinearity, as all of the correlations among the independent 
variables are below the commonly accepted threshold of 0.4. The only exception is the 
correlation between the dummies of headquarters in North America and Asia of 0.44, which 
follows naturally from the way the dummies are constructed. The correlation matrix also 
indicates that task complexity is high for R&D services, knowledge/analytical services and 
software development, while it is low for call centers and HR services. This is very much in line 
with our expectations of knowledge-based activities being high on this scale, while standardized 
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activities are low. As for configuration complexity, call center operations, and finance and 
accounting-services correlate positively with this type of complexity, whereas procurement and 
product design show negative correlations. The potential multi-collinearity is further investigated 
by including VIF-values in the tested non-interaction models, and as shown in Table 2 none of 
the VIF-values exceed the usual threshold of 6 (the only exception is the variable ‘competition’; 
however, as this variable is constructed within the different areas of services that are also 
controlled for, this is not unexpected).  
***Insert Table 1 here*** 
 Our unit of analysis is the individual service area. However, since some of the 
observations belong to the same firm (on average each firm provided information for 2.3 service 
areas) the assumption of independence among the observations is violated and we cannot run 
ordinary regression models. Instead, we ran a Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) where we rule 
out firm interdependence as a random firm effect. More specifically, we ran HLMs with random 
intercepts at level 1 (the firm level) and fixed effects for all other variables at level 2 (the level of 
the service area). HLMs are particularly suitable given the nested structure of our data, the 
character of our dependent variable and the proposed relationships. Several alternative models 
have been tested, like ordinary regression models with firm fixed effects; however, results are 
qualitatively similar, but with weaker explanatory power. We examined residual plots and 
normal probability plots of the residuals for the tested models. To ease the interpretation of the 
HLM coefficients, we grand mean centered the independent variables (Hofmann and Gavin, 
1998). The centering of the variables is also an advantage when conducting interaction effects as 
both interaction terms are centered on zero. In addition, we went one step further by 
standardizing all variables (mean=0 and std. dev.=1), but got very similar results, so we present 
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the results for the centered variables. Since endogeneity might be a concern with some of the 
included variables, such as profit margin and complexity, we ran a number of Hausman tests 
(e.g., the endogeneity between profit margin and commoditization, task complexity and 
commoditization, task complexity and configuration complexity), but none indicated a 
significant problem of endogeneity. 
 Model 1 is our baseline model that only includes our control variables. In Models 2 and 3 
we add separately the main effects of task complexity (Model 2) and configuration complexity 
(Model 3). Model 4 includes the main effects of our four hypothesized variables: configuration 
complexity, task complexity, process commoditization and client-specific investments. Finally, 
in Model 5, which is our full model, we add the two interaction effects between configuration 
complexity and commoditization, and between task complexity and client-specific investments. 
The results are presented in Table 2 with the coefficients, significance level, standard errors (in 
parentheses) and VIF-values (in italics) for each parameter. 
***Insert Table 2 here*** 
Model 1 indicates that none of the control variables is significant in explaining profit 
margin. Only the firm (level 1 intercept) has a significant effect on profit margins in Model 1, 
which indicates that a significant part of the variation in profit margins (for each service class) 
can be explained at the firm level. However, since our focus is on exploring the effect of 
complexity on performance at the level of the service class, we control out the firm-level effect 
without further investigating the nature of this firm-level effect. When separately adding the 
complexity variables in Models 2 and 3, only task complexity turned out to have a significant 
main effect (in Model 2), while configuration complexity is insignificant (Model 3). We also 
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tested for non-linear relationships by separately adding the second order effects and the product 
of task complexity and configuration complexity, but all these effects turned out insignificant.  
In Model 4, which includes the main effect of all our hypothesized variables, both task 
complexity and configuration complexity turn out significant, and with opposite signs, as 
expected. Configuration complexity affects profit margins negatively (β=-0.10, p < 0.05), while 
task complexity positively affects providers’ profit margin (β=2.64, p < 0.001) – as proposed in 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The full model is specified as Model 5, including the two interaction 
effects. This model also presents a significant improvement compared to Models 1 and 4. The – 
2 log likelihood value is 3320.5 which is the best (lowest) of the presented models. It is 
noticeable that both interaction effects become significant as expected, while all other 
coefficients are relatively similar. The interaction effect between configuration complexity and 
process commoditization is significant and positive (β=0.69, p < 0.01). This implies that the 
negative effect of configuration complexity on profit margins is reduced when the services are 
increasingly commoditized. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a can be supported. The interaction effect 
between task complexity and client-specific investment has the expected negative sign (β= -0.25, 
p < 0.05), and is significant at the 5%-level. This means that Hypothesis 2b can also be 
supported.  
***Insert Figures 1 and 2 here*** 
Since the sum of direct and indirect effects of the four variables included in the 
interaction effects is difficult to interpret, it is customary to draw the relationship in a graph as 
shown in Figure 1 and 2 (Aiken and West, 1991). Figures 1 and 2 are based on the coefficients of 
Model 5, and show the combined effect of the four variables that form the two interaction 
effects. The figures emphasize the moderating role of commoditization and client-specific 
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investments, respectively. Figure 1 indicates that profit margins are highest when configuration 
complexity is low. When configuration complexity is high, profit margins generally drop, but 
they drop much more in case of low degree of commoditization. This indicates that degree of 
commoditization has performance implications in particular when configuration complexity is 
high. In turn, Figure 2 shows that profit margins are lowest when task complexity is low. When 
task complexity is high, profit margins rise slightly when providers need to make high levels of 
client-specific investments. However, they rise much more when providers do not need to make 
substantial client-specific investments. This implies that client-specific investments affect 
performance in particular in case of high task complexity.  
To further interpret these results, we conducted simple slope tests for both interactions, as 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. In the simple slope tests we vary our moderating variables from two 
standard deviations below the mean (-2 SD) to two standard deviations above the mean (+2 SD) 
in order to tease out the moderating effect. In Table 3, where configuration complexity is 
moderated by commoditization, the gradient is negative in the whole window indicating that 
configuration complexity has a general negative effect on performance. However, the gradient 
becomes even more negative and significant the lower the level of commoditization. Contrary, in 
Table 4 the gradient is positive irrespective of the value of the moderator (client-specific 
investments), signifying a general positive performance effect of task complexity. However, this 
becomes weaker (lower gradient) when the level of client-specific investments increases. 
***Insert Tables 3 and 4 here*** 
 Finally, we note that two of our control variables are significantly related to profit 
margins: competition (β= -0.20, p < 0.01) and the use of subcontractors (β=3.59, p < 0.05). 
While the negative effect of competition is expected, the positive effect of the use of 
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subcontractors is less evident. On the one hand, the use of subcontractors should entail additional 
coordination costs with fewer opportunities to appropriate additional rents. On the other hand, 
the use of subcontractors may also suggest that providers themselves specialize in fewer areas of 
expertise, and are hence better positioned to extrapolate additional profit from those activities. 
We encourage future research to explore this issue further. 
Additional robustness tests 
We conducted a number of robustness checks to verify that our models are an unbiased account 
of our data. First, we ran models with alternative specifications of the interaction effects by 
interacting client-specific investments with configuration complexity and commoditization with 
task complexity. However, regardless of whether these interaction effects were tested alone or in 
addition to other interaction effects, none of the models turned out to be significant. Accordingly, 
none of these alternative models was superior to our existing models. Second, we tested for a 
potential joint (interaction) effect of configuration complexity and task complexity on profit 
margins. This interaction effect between our two types of complexity turned out insignificant 
(β=-0.003, p = 0.35). Together with the low correlation among them (of 0.03), our results 
indicate that they are rather distinct types of complexity which affect profit margins differently. 
Third, we tested for non-linear effects of both our two complexity variables and our two 
moderators, but did not find any significant non-linear specifications of these variables. Finally, 
we ran our models excluding the larger firms in our sample. When excluding all firms with more 
than 10,000 employees all our hypothesized relationships remained significant. However, when 
further excluding firms with more than 5,000 employees almost 100 observations are omitted 
and some of our results (specifically the interaction between task complexity and client-specific 
investments) become insignificant.    
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
According to Reed and DeFillippi (1990: 91), “Complexity results from the relationship between 
skills, and between skills and assets. To suggest that complexity itself is a direct source of 
advantage would be misleading. However, the way in which the firm combines its skills and 
resources can be a source of advantage.” In this article, we have focused on the specific 
contingencies that can explain firm performance as a result of increasing complexity. Much 
management research has tended to treat complexity as a one-dimensional construct associated 
with the level of interdependency between elements of a system – which may lead to negative 
consequences such as inefficiencies, inertia and lack of response capacity (Park and Ungson, 
2001; Robson et al., 2008), but also potentially generate sources of competitive advantage and 
revenue generation (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Nayyar, 1993). Yet, the effects of complexity 
on performance often remain ambivalent (Houchin and MacLean, 2005). 
 To get a clearer understanding, we distinguished here between task and configuration 
complexity and their specific effects on firm performance. We argue and show empirically that 
configuration complexity negatively affects profit margins, whereas task complexity has a 
positive effect. Coordination costs are at the core of understanding these different effects. While 
the emergence of coordination costs is well-understood in the literature (Galbraith, 1973; 
Thompson, 1967; Zhou, 2011), we add to this debate that the degree to which focal firms need to 
‘bear’ such costs may depend on where complexity arises and how it is moderated by other 
factors. In the case of configuration complexity, which arises from expanding operations across 
locations, firms typically need to bear the full costs of coordinating these operations. Such costs 
may be reduced, however, when processes are highly commoditized. By comparison, in the case 
of task complexity, costs of coordination are distributed among those parties involved in either 
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requesting or performing a particular task. High task complexity gives firms the opportunity to 
exploit information asymmetries and ‘zones of uncertainty’ (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980) vis-à-
vis clients and delegate task-specific investments and other coordination costs to clients, which 
may positively affect margins. Likewise, under certain conditions, such as high bargaining power 
of clients, providers may need to make client-specific investments, thus bearing a higher share of 
coordination costs. This will lower the otherwise positive performance effects of task 
complexity. Under all circumstances, future research should take into account the fact that 
different types of complexity may produce opposing performance effects. 
Obviously, we are not ruling out the alternative performance effects of configuration and 
task complexity. For example, firms deciding to diversify—i.e., increase their configuration 
complexity—can achieve strong scope economies by replicating old routines across new units 
(Teece, 1980). Equally, it is well established that task complexity is associated with a surge in 
costs such as information seeking and use (Byström and Järvelin, 1995). Yet, when comparing 
and contrasting the two levels of analysis emphasized in this paper, we argue that the costs of 
complexity dominate in the configurational domain whereas the benefits of complexity prevail 
on the level of tasks. Future research should thus continue investigating how and under what 
conditions complexity can increase revenue and eventually promote competitiveness, and how 
different types of complexity may yield different results.  
These results have broader implications for management and strategy research. First, our 
findings shed light on the trade-off between managing coordination costs and meeting client 
expectations through the set-up of complex operations. On the one hand, we find that building 
configuration complexity, e.g. through diversification, may facilitate access to markets or 
improve existing client relationships, but these benefits are potentially undermined by the 
31 
 
coordination costs involved in setting up such operations. Interestingly, while we do find that a 
higher degree of commoditization of distributed processes may lower such costs (see e.g. 
Davenport, 2005), this may also generate another dilemma: the more commoditized the 
processes are, the easier others can imitate them. This is a dilemma global service providers are 
currently facing: while many have responded to the demand of clients for global delivery 
networks (see e.g. Manning et al., 2015), their ability to actually differentiate from competitors is 
limited, since many peers have established very similar systems. It is thus important to realize 
that managing distributed operations poses a strategic dilemma that cannot be easily resolved. 
Future research should thus investigate more systematically how firms deal with the dilemma of 
the coordination benefits of commoditization and the threat of imitation.  
On the other hand, we also argue that task complexity is only beneficial for client-serving 
firms if the task can be completed without significant client-specific investments that would 
increase costs and lower information asymmetry. Again, this poses an interesting dilemma. Prior 
research shows that while providing sophisticated services may indeed drive revenue, longer-
term profitability is more a function of how likely clients are willing to renew contracts and 
develop enduring relationships with suppliers (Larsen and Lyngsie, 2016). This, in turn, is 
affected by the willingness of suppliers to make client-specific investments (see e.g. Manning et 
al., 2011; Luo et al., 2013). However, making such investments may also lower the ability of 
providers to generate economies of scale and exploit capabilities across client relationships 
(Kang et al., 2009). So, even at the task level, our findings point to more systematic performance 
dilemmas firms may face when offering complex and sophisticated products and services. Future 
research should hence explore how firms balance the benefits of retaining information 
asymmetry while building long-term relationships with their clients. 
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Our results also carry important managerial and practical implications. Our article shows 
that firms, especially in business-to-business sectors, may turn configuration complexity into a 
value proposition for clients, which would potentially allow them to delegate part of the 
coordination costs and generate more revenue. For example, global consulting firms are 
particularly good at linking their global presence to their ability of simultaneously serving 
multiple operations of globally distributed clients. Their global presence may be turned into a 
rather intangible asset and capability that allows them to not only charge clients higher rates, but 
also make them invest into systems that suppliers have built up across their own network already. 
High-end software providers, such as SAP, would be another good example of such a strategy. 
Similarly, Manning et al. (2015) find that global service providers are more likely to build global 
delivery networks if their clients demand – and select providers based on – high speed of service 
delivery. Turning configuration complexity into a more client-oriented asset may also solve the 
dilemma posed by commoditization. The more clients are willing to pay for globally integrated 
supplier structures, the less pressure on margins providers face and the less they are dependent 
on limiting global expansion to highly competitive operations. 
At the same time, our findings imply that, in order to maintain profitable, providers need 
to manage the need to invest into long-term client relationships while maintaining control over 
operations in order to reap the benefits from offering complex and knowledge-intensive services. 
One interesting strategy of leading global service providers is to make clients co-invest into 
cloud infrastructures and service automation (FE Bureau, 2016; Manning et al., 2018) that allow 
providers to apply capabilities across clients, delegate part of the coordination costs to clients, 
and also build longer-term client relationships. Another strategy is to sell platforms clients need 
to co-invest into rather than individual services. Platform providers such as SAP have a clear 
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advantage in being able to sell clients a standard platform which will enable clients to not only 
integrate multiple services but also better communicate and coordinate with their own suppliers 
and business partners. Smaller providers may need to invest into leading platforms or cloud 
technologies to lower adoption costs for clients and to reap the benefits of longer-term client 
relationships based on infrastructures they can use across clients instead of making risky client-
specific investments that might negatively affect their margins. 
This study also has some notable limitations that future research should seek to address. 
First, research should strive to identify more sophisticated and accurate measures of task and 
configuration complexity. While we have relied on previous literature in measuring these 
constructs, a central component of our argument is that these types of complexity create 
coordination costs and information asymmetry, respectively. Unfortunately, given the nature of 
our cross-sectional data we are not able to directly measure these mechanisms. Also, the use of 
single-items for measures, such as task complexity and commoditization, is a limitation of our 
empirical strategy. Thus, besides the immediate limitations related to our proxies, the research 
design makes it difficult to appropriately detect problems of endogeneity. Future studies should 
therefore seek to create more robust, multi-item constructs of the variables underlying the 
hypothesized relationships presented in this article. Another fruitful avenue for further research 
would be to explore the multilevel nature of the issue as complexity affects many levels in the 
organization. Specifically, while we have emphasized how task and configuration complexity 
affect performance differently, it may also be that these types of complexity impact different 
levels of the firm differently. Accordingly, future research could look into the nature of different 
firm level effects. For example, research could investigate the amount of complexity occurring at 
different levels of the firms; how different firm-level variables may interact; and eventually how 
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this alters the effects of complexity on performance. Relatedly, we have only discussed and 
measured performance in terms of a perceptual measure of profit margins. Although this is not 
an uncommon measurement of firm performance, and in particular in highly innovative, 
competitive and fast-changing industries, there are reasons to question this measure. For 
example, service quality (Elia et al., 2014) or sales growth (Lahiri and Kedia, 2009) may be 
equally important performance measures in the service provider industry. We therefore 
encourage future research to strive for alternative and objective measures when exploring the 
performance consequences of complexity. 
In conclusion, we have presented findings that put more weight on the performance 
mechanisms of complexity. While we have emphasized the theoretical implications of this focus, 
we also argue that our findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of performance 
conditions in the service provider industry. Whereas many studies in the offshoring and 
outsourcing domain have taken a client view by emphasizing their need to save costs and 
mitigate risks associated with providers (Luo et al. 2013; Narayahan et al., 2011), we take a 
provider’s perspective. In particular, we emphasize key tensions facing providers between the 
need to increase the scope and distribution of operations along with client-specific investments to 
attract clients, which puts pressure on margins, and the possibility to commoditize processes, yet 
also focus on more complex tasks to generate revenue opportunities (Sako, 2006). Importantly, 
we demonstrate how coordination costs may function as a crucial performance determinant in an 
industry characterized by a rich variety of services, firms, and highly innovative, competitive and 
fast-changing markets.  
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Figure 1: Relation between configuration complexity and process commoditization 
 
Figure 2: Relation between task complexity and client-specific investments 
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Table 1: Correlation matrix (n=432)* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1) Profit  margins 1
2) Configuration complexity -0.01 1
3) Task complexity 0.16 0.03 1
4) Commoditization 0.03 -0.01 -0.24 1
5) Client-specific investment -0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.04 1
6) Provider experience -0.14 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 1
7) Number of services -0.15 0.09 -0.02 -0.11 0.12 -0.01 1
8) Duration of deals -0.13 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.29 0.06 1
9) Specification of contracts -0.03 -0.01 0.2 -0.09 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.2 1
10) Competition 0.11 0.06 0.11 -0.23 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.07 1
11) Long-term relationships -0.14 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.34 0.22 0.3 0.34 -0.02 1
12) Use of suncontractor 0.12 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.2 0.04 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 0.05 -0.15 1
13) Innovation as a driver 0.08 -0.02 0.28 -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.1 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.04 1
14) R&D 0.08 0.01 0.2 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 1
15) Call Center -0.06 -0.12 -0.21 0.19 0.1 -0.01 0.06 0.09 0.04 -0.34 0.04 -0.1 -0.09 -0.08 1
16) Engineering Services -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.18 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 1
17) Finance/accounting -0.03 0.07 -0.11 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 1
18) Human Resources 0.04 0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.32 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 1
19) IT  infrastructure -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.15 -0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.37 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.12 -0.16 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 1
20) Knowledge Services 0.06 0.03 0.14 -0.16 0.05 0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.1 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 1
21) Legal Services 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.17 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 1
22) Marketing and Sales 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.20 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 1
23) Procurement -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 0.11 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 1
24) Design 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 1
25) Software Development -0.01 -0.04 0.15 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 0.32 -0.96 -0.05 0.02 -0.11 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.24 -0.1 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.1 1
26) HQ-Latin America -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.01 1
27) HQ-North America 0.19 0.04 0.1 -0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.2 1
28) HQ-Europe -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.1 -0.01 -0.21 -0.11 -0.19 0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.2 -0.35 1
29) HQ-Asia -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.18 -0.07 0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.2 -0.44 -0.34 1
Mean 26 -0.01 3.6 3.1 3.3 9.17 3.75 2.26 3.29 56.3 35.1 0.25 3.23 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.31 0.21 0.30
Standard deviation 18.6 0.35 1.02 1.04 1.13 8.49 2.2 2.73 1.03 27.7 32.5 0.43 1.07 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.4 0.2 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.38 0.28 0.46 0.41 0.46
Min. value 0 -4.54 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 9.63 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. value 100 2.15 5 5 5 85 10 37 5 100 100 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
* all values above |0.09| are significant at 5%-level of significance
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Table 2: Hierarchical Linear Modelling (n = 432)* with profit margins as the DV (standard errors in parentheses and VIF-values in Italics) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, ** and *** indicates a level of significance of 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. Two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Configuration complexity   -0.01 
(0.03)   -  1.76 
-0.10* 
(0.04)  -  1.77 
- 0.19** 
(0.07)  -  10.69 
Task complexity  2.63**’ 
(0.62)  -  1.55 
 2.64*** 
(0.63)   -  1.55 
2.84*** 
(0.63)  -  9.99 
Commoditization  0.15 
(0.58)  -  1.25 
0.82 
(0.58)   -  1.18 
0.15 
(0.58)  -  1.25 
0.73 
(0.65)  -  4.64 
Client-specific investment  -0.61 
(0.57)  -  1.14 
-0.50 
(0.59)  -  1.18 
-0.57 
(0.59)  -  1.19 
- 0.72 
(0.65)  -  14.56 
Configuration complexity * Commoditization     0.69** 
(0.30)  -  10.10 
Task complexity * Client-specific investment     - 0.25* 
(0.12)  -  15.60 
Control variables  
Years of experience with service  0.06 
(0.08)  - 1.28 
0.05 
(0.08)  -  1.29 
0.06 
(0.08)  -  1.31 
0.05 
(0.08)  -  1.31 
0.06 
(0.08)  -  1.33 
Number of services  0.43 
(0.72)  -  1.23 
0.36 
(0.71)  -  1.24 
0.41 
(0.72)  -  1.26 
0.35 
(0.71)  -  1.26 
0.37 
(0.71)  -  1.27 
Average duration of deals -0.06 
(0.25)  -  1.26 
-0.07 
(0.25)  -  1.27 
-0.06 
(0.25)  -  1.27 
-0.07 
(0.25)  -  1.27 
-0.04 
(0.25)  -  1.28 
Specification of contracts   -0.06 
(0.59)  -  1.27 
-0.12 
(0.57)  -  1.32 
-0.07 
(0.59)  -  1.28 
-0.11 
(0.57)  -  1.33 
-0.02 
(0.57)  -  1.33 
Competition -0.12 
(0.07)   -  8.75 
-0.16 
(0.07)  -  8.71 
-0.11 
(0.08)  -  9.24 
-0.17* 
(0.08)  -  9.78 
-0.20** 
(0.08)  -  10.12 
Share of relationships lasting 5 years or more -0.06 
(0.04)  -  1.44 
-0.06 
(0.04)  -  1.45 
-0.06 
(0.04)  -  1.45 
-0.06 
(0.04)  -  1.45 
-0.06 
(0.04)  -  1.46 
Use of subcontractor 2.48 
(1.41)   -  1.13 
3.21* 
(1.39)  -  1.18 
2.75* 
(1.42)  -  1.17 
3.25* 
(1.40)  -  1.18 
3.59* 
(1.40)  -  1.19 
Innovation as a driver 0.34 
(0.65)   -  1.11 
0.29 
(0.65)  -  1.18 
0.31 
(0.65)  -  1.14 
0.27 
(0.65)  -  1.21 
0.26 
(0.65)  -  1.21 
Area of service (12 dummies)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region of headquarter (4 dummies)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 29.8*** 
(1.48) 
26.8*** 
(1.47) 
26.8*** 
(1.48) 
26.8*** 
(1.47) 
26.9*** 
(1.47) 
Firm-effects (Level 1 - Intercept) 275.3*** 
(31.6) 
273.6*** 
(31.2) 
276.6*** 
(31.7) 
272.1*** 
(31.2) 
271.6*** 
(31.1) 
N 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 
Likelihood Ratio test (compared with Model 1) 
432 
3344.1 
 
 
432 
3329.9 
 
14.2 (3 df)*** 
432 
3342.0 
 
2.1 (3 df)* 
432 
3324.8 
 
19.3 (4 df)*** 
432 
3320.5 
 
23.6 (6 df)*** 
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Table 3. Simple slope test for interaction between configuration complexity and commoditization 
Commoditization -2 SD - 1SD Mean + 1 SD + 2SD 
Gradient -5.05 -3.43 -1.97 -0.94 -0.15 
t-value  -5.97 -5.57 -2.23 -1.56 -0.10 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.92 
 
 
Table 4. Simple slope test for interaction between task complexity and client-specific investments 
Client-specific investments -2 SD - 1 SD Mean + 1 SD + 2SD 
Gradient 4.63 3.54 2.69 1.77 0.82 
t-value  3.65 4.21 3.68 1.80 0.57 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.57 
 
 
 
